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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After a delay of approximately two months due to a rollback from the pad to
replace the External Tank door lug housing, Space Shuttle Discovery was launched from
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at 7:33 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 28,
1991. STS-39 was the first unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) Shuttle mission.
The purpose of this mission was to test sensors and tracking devices for the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). The amount and quality of Air Force/SDI data collected
significantly exceeded expectations.
On April 28, countdown proceeded normally through the T-20 minute hold. No
significant problems were encountered except for the Operations Sequence (OPS)-2
recorder starting unexpectedly; it was stopped by an uplink command. The T-9 minute
hold was extended to evaluate the OPS-2 recorder anomaly. It was determined that
there was no problem with the Orbiter's computers. The countdown was then resumed,
and Space Shuttle Discovery was subsequently launched.
STS-39/OV-104 ascent performance was nominal. However, approximately
15 minutes after Main Engine Cutoff (MECO), Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) #2 Fuel
Pump (FP)/Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) coolant system "A" Flow Control
Valve (FCV) was not pulsing as commanded. Coolant system "B" was selected, and
nominal cooling occurred. Coolant system "A" was not used during entry, and therefore
did not impact entry operations.
Payload operations were very successful. However, the sun sensor used for
alignment of the Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS) deployed on Flight Day (FD) 3
repeatedly swung SPAS into the wrong attitude. The cause of the original sun sensor
anomaly was not determined. The SPAS was redeployed on FD 4, with no problems
experienced. Discovery performed 60 rocket firings at various distance from the SPAS
over a 36-hour period.
Discovery landed on KSC runway 15 at 2:55 p.m. EDT on May 6, 1991. This was
the second time in 6 months that the Space Shuttle was diverted to KSC for landing
because of high winds at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. This was also the
seventh of 40 Shuttle missions to land at KSC in the history of the Space Shuttle
Program. The Main Landing Gear (MLG) outer right tire shredded 3 of the 16 cords
due to either an uneven landing or a maximum-force breaking test during rollout.
Contributing factors to the tire cord shredding were the development of last-minute
crosswinds and reluctance of the ground controllers to distract the Shuttle pilots with
warnings of the low flightpath. As a corrective action, communication procedures will be
modified for future flights to allow ground controllers more latitude to talk to the crew.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document that
is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission
Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space Shuttle
flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change,
or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk factors
impacting the STS-39 flight were also documented prior to the STS-39 Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and the STS-39 Launch Minus Two-Day (L-2) Review
(L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety risk
factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-39 safety risk factors that represen t a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-39 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-39 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-39
flight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-39.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-37 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-41
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle (OV-103).
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-39
mission. Those IFAs considered to represent a safety risk will
be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains presentation
data, white papers, and other documentation. These data were
used to support the resolution rationale or retention of open
status for each item discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-39 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-39 Mission
After a delay of approximately two months due to a rollback from the pad to
replace the External Tank door lug housing, Space Shuttle Discovery was launched from
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at 7:33 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 28,
1991. STS-39 was the first unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) Shuttle mission.
The purpose of this mission was to test sensors and tracking devices for the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). The amount and quality of Air Force/SDI data collected
significantly exceeded expectations.
On April 28, countdown proceeded normally through the T-20 minute hold; no
significant problems were encountered. When countdown was resumed at the end of the
T-20 minute hold, the Operations Sequence (OPS)-2 recorder started unexpectedly; it
was stopped by an uplink command. Countdown then proceeded to the T-9 minute
hold, which was extended to evaluate the OPS-2 recorder anomaly. It was determined
that there was no problem with the Orbiter's computers. The countdown was then
resumed from the T-9 minute point, and Space Shuttle Discovery was subsequently
launched.
STS-39/OV-104 ascent performance was nominal. However, approximately
15 minutes after Main Engine Cutoff (MECO), Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) #2 Fuel
Pump (FP)/Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) coolant system "A" Flow Control
Valve (FCV) was not pulsing as commanded. Coolant system "B" was selected, and
nominal cooling occurred. Coolant system "A" was not used during entry and, therefore,
did not impact entry operations.
With the exception of one malfunction, the Quadruple Ion-Neutral Mass
Spectrometer (QINMS) cover did not move when first commanded, all payload
operations were nominal on Flight Day (FD) 1. However, the QINMS cover was
commanded to move a second time, and operation was normal. The OPS-2 recorder
that had unexpectedly gone to "record" prior to launch performed nominally.
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On FD 2, the Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for Shuttle (CIRRIS)
data acquisition quantity wasabove expectation;9 of the 17CIRRIS experimentswere
completed. By the end of the mission,the CIRRIS infrared telescopecompleted 15of
the 17CIRRIS data takes; overall CIRRIS data acquisition was 150% of the planned
pre-mission data.
On FD 3, the Infrared Background SignatureSurvey (IBSS) was releasedusing
Discovery's Remote Manipulator System (RMS). The Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS) was
also deployed successfully. However, the sun sensor used for the SPAS alignment
repeatedly swung it into the wrong attitude; this delayed the associated experiments for
about 9 hours. The SPAS was redeployed on FD 4, with no problems experienced.
Discovery performed 60 rocket firings at various distance from the SPAS over a 36-hour
period. The cause of the original sun sensor anomaly was not determined.
On FD 5, the Chemical Release Observation (CRO) experiment "B" was deployed,
and CRO activities were successfully completed on FD 6. The SPAS/IBSS payload was
reberthed and placed on Orbiter power via the Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical
(ROEU).
Discovery landed on KSC runway 15 at 2:55 p.m. EDT on May 6, 1991. This was
the second time in 6 months that the Space Shuttle was diverted to KSC for landing
because of high winds at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. This was also the
seventh of 40 Shuttle missions to land at KSC in the history of the Program. During
landing, the Main Landing Gear (MLG) right-side tires contacted the runway before the
MLG left-side tires; 168 feet from the threshold for the right tires and 383 feet for the
left tires. The MLG outer right tire shredded 3 of its 16 cords due to either the uneven
landing or a maximum-force breaking test during rollout. Rollout lasted for 56 seconds;
braking pressure was applied for 36 seconds of this time. Contributing factors to the tire
cord shredding were development of last-minute crosswinds and reluctance of the ground
controllers to distract the Shuttle pilots with warnings of the low flightpath. As a
corrective action, communication procedures will be modified for future flights to allow
ground controllers more latitude to talk to the crew.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: April 28, 1991
• Launch Time: 7:33 a.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A
RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
TAL Site: Zaragosa, Spain
Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain
Landing Site: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 15
Landing Date: May 6, 1991
Landing Time: 2:55 p.m. EDT
Mission Duration: 8 Days, 7 Hours, 22 Minutes
Crew Size: 7
Inclination: 57.0*, Direct Insertion
Orbit: 140 x 140 Nautical Miles
Orbiter: OV-103 (12)Discovery
ET-46
SRBs: BI-043
RSRM Flight Set #15
MLP #2
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ENGINE #2026 #2030 #2029
POWERHEAD #2030 #2015 #2027
MCC* #2104 #2026 #4012
NOZZLE #4014 #4013 #4015
CONTROLLER F19 F17 F22
FASCOS* # 11 #26 #28
HPFTP* #4012R1 #4011R2 #2126
LPFTP* # 2025 R2 # 2027 # 2029
HPOTP* #2226R3 #4506R 1 #4008R3
LPOTP* #2224 #2020 #2121
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Miscellaneous Items of Interest for the STS-39 Mission.
This was the second mission with the new AP-101S General Purpose
Computer (GPC) in all 6 GPC positions (5 active, 1 spare).
This was the second mission using the OI-08F software release for the
Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) and the Backup Flight Software
(BFS). This was also the second mission using the AR-02 software release in
the Main Engine Controller (MEC).
The Hydrogen Dispersal System was installed on Mobile Launch Platform
(MLP) #2 prior to the first STS-39 pad evolution in February 1991.
The 31 pounds per square inch gage (psig) Gaseous Oxygen (GO2) Flow
Control Valves (FCVs) were shimmed to the step #1 FCV configuration;
93% in high flow and 55% in low flow.
During the first STS-39 pad evolution, an anomaly occurred with the Right-
Hand (RH) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Range Safety System (RSS)
Automatic Gain Control (AGC). The AGC signal level was reported to be
6 decibels (dB) below normal, but not out-of-specification. Troubleshooting
could not be scheduled prior to rollback of STS-39 to the Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB). During the second pad test evolution, no problems were
encountered with the RSS AGC. Troubleshooting performed to recreate the
earlier anomaly was unsuccessful. A special open-loop test was also
conducted with the RSS transmitter in the launch configuration (in the high-
power, omni-directional mode). All RSS receivers responded properly during
this test. This anomaly was dispositioned as unexplained; the Eastern Test
Range Safety Organization concurred. No postflight anomalies were reported
for this system.
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2.4 Payload Data
The STS-39 mission was the first unclassified Department of Defense (DoD)
dedicated Space Shuttle mission, highlighted by around-the-clock observations of the
atmosphere, gas releases, Shuttle engine firings, subsatellite gas releases, and the
Shuttle's orbital environment encompassing a wavelength range from infrared to the far
ultraviolet.
The Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) was flown for the first time
on STS-39/OV-103. The ROEU provides a capability for remote separation (or
connection) of electrical services between the Orbiter and the payload. System control
(mate/demate process) is performed from the Orbiter aft fight deck. Active elements of
the ROEU were incorporated in the Orbiter-mounted portion of the system located on
the payload bay longeron.
Payload Bay:
Air Force Program-675 (AFP-675) -- collected infrared data to support the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program. AFP-675 is an experiment support
system consisting of the Shuttle and 5 sensing instruments. The sensing
instruments included:
Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for Shuttle (CIRRIS) --
obtained simultaneous spectral and spatial measurements of airglow and
auroral emissions.
Far Ultraviolet Camera (FAR UV) Experiment -- used for imaging and
photometry of natural and man-made far ultraviolet emission
phenomena.
-- Uniformly Redundant Array (URA) -- studied astrophysical sources of
x-ray radiation.
-- Quadruple Ion-Neutral Mass Spectrometer (QINMS) -- determined ion
and neutral contamination species identification for CIRRIS.
Horizon Ultraviolet Program (HUP) -- demonstrated the capability to
measure spatial and spectral characteristics of the Earth's horizon as
observed in the ultraviolet wavelength region and to analyze Shuttle
contamination.
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Infrared Background SignatureSurvey (IBSS) --was composed of 3 separate
elements: the Shuttle Pallet Satellite-II (SPAS-II), the Critical Ionization
Velocity (CIV) package, and the Chemical Release Observation (CRO)
experiment.
The SPAS-II element incorporated a liquid-helium-cooled infrared
sensor, the Arizona Imager/Spectrograph (A/S) multispectral sensor,
2 low-light television cameras, and various support subsystems. SPAS-II
was deployed from the Orbiter using the Remote Manipulator System
(RMS), and gathered spectral and spatial data during several
experiments.
The CRO experiment collected infrared, visible, and ultraviolet time-
resolved radiometric data associated with the release of liquid rocket
propellants in near Earth orbit. The CRO consists of 3 subsatellites and
associated launcher systems. Each satellite was loaded with a different
chemical: Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH) -- CRO A, Unsymmetric
Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH) -- CRO B, and Nitrogen Tetroxide (N204)
-- CRO C.
The CIV package investigated the interaction of neutral gases with the
ambient weakly-magnetized plasma. The CIV element included
4 compressed gas canisters (xenon, neon, carbon dioxide, and nitrous
oxide) that released plumes of gas out of the Orbiter bay upon crew
command. The SPAS-II and the CIV monitor system observed the gas
as it was released.
Space Test Program-01 (STP-01) -- consisted of 5 experiments, including
instrument electronics and control systems mounted on a Hitchhiker-M cross-
bay carrier.
Advanced Liquid Feed Experiment (ALFE) -- studied zero-gravity
performance of liquid collection systems. The ALFE provided the first
spaceflight demonstration of an electronic pressure regulator and a series
of ultrasonic propellant-level and flow-sensing systems that are key
components of an advanced spacecraft propulsion system.
-- Ascent Particle Monitor (APM) -- measured particle activity in the
payload bay during the immediate prelaunch period and during ascent.
Ultraviolet Limb Imaging (UVLIM) Experiment -- studied the
composition of the atmosphere using measurements of the ultraviolet
airglow.
2-7 STS-39 Postflight Edition
Data SystemExperiment (DSE) -- evaluated the performance of the MIL
VAX computer and Erasable Optical Disk (EOD) in a microgravity
environment.
Spacecraft Kinetic Infrared Test (SKIRT) -- measured the atomic o_gen
glow effect in visible, infrared, and ultraviolet spectra. The SKIRT
consisted of 2 separate and independent components: the Gaseous
Luminosity of Optical Surface (GLOS) and Circular Variable Filter
(CVF).
Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister (MPEC) -- is a modified Get Away Special
(GAS) canister containing an ejectable experiment.
Ultraviolet Plume Instrument (UVPI) -- obtained imagery and/or signature data
of the Orbiter for space-based ultraviolet sensors on the UVPI satellite.
Middeek:
Cloud Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems (CLOUDS)-IA-1 -- is a hand-
held 35 mm camera for use by the crew to take a series of high-resolution
photographs of cloud formation, dissipation, and opaqueness.
Radiation Monitoring Equipment (RME) III-03 -- measured the rate and
dosage of ionizing radiation to the crew at different locations throughout the
Orbiter cabin. The hand-held instrument measures gamma ray, electron,
neutron, and proton radiation, and calculates the amount of exposure.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-39 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-39 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-39 flight (see Section 7). The list
indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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Section 4:
Orbiter 5
ITEM
Resolved STS-39 Safe_ Ri_k Factors
Potential for lube oil leak
on STS-39/OV-103
Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) #2, Serial Number
(S/N) 301, gearbox.
COMMENT
STS-39/OV-103 APU #2, S/N 301, was
observed with signs of lube oil around
the gearbox seam. This observation was
made during lube oil drain operations.
The exact source of the oil was
unknown; oil was presumed to have
leaked from the gearbox. Initial
troubleshooting included wiping the
gearbox seam clean and pressurizing the
gearbox to 50 pounds per square inch
absolute (psia), greater than 2 times the
gearbox operating pressure. Post-
pressurization inspection found slight
traces of lube oil. The gearbox was
serviced and again pressurized to 50
psia. Inspection found no new signs of
lube oil; however, a minor pressure
drop was noted during this period (less
than 2 psia). This pressure drop was
believed to have been due to pressure
released through the seal cavity drain
vent. The APU gearbox condition was
reviewed by the Material Review Board
and approved for flight "as is".
During STS-39 entry, APU #2,
S/N 301, lube oil outlet pressure was
low, reading 25 psia; nominal outlet
pressure is 40 to 50 psia (IFA No.
STS-39-V-11). Postflight visual
inspection of the aft compartment at
KSC showed no indication of a leak.
This was the first APU lube oil
pressure-low anomaly in the Program.
Previous lube oil anomalies were
related to high lube oil outlet pressure.
It was concluded that the low oil
pressure was due to low oil quantity,
which occurred prior to flight during the
Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) ullage
check processing.
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ITEM
Section 4: Resolved STS-39 Safety_ Risk Factors
SRM 2 Inner Boot Ring (IBR)
bond line separation on
STS-38 Right-Hand (RH)
Solid Rocket Motor
(SRM).
COMMENT
No SRM IBR anomalies were reported
on STS-39. Postflight inspection of
STS-39 did, however, identify 11
circumferential areas of erosion/
washing and wedgeouts in the nozzle
cowl/Outer Boot Ring (OBR) (IFA No.
STS-39-M-01). A trend assessment
performed using Redesigned Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM) historical flight
data indicated no general trend of
degraded performance or increased
wedgeouts or washouts. The trend
assessment also determined that the
STS-39 RH cowl wedgeouts represented
the worst case to date for a flight motor.
Relative to the OBR, the trend
assessment illustrated a small decrease
of the mean margin of safety; however,
no violation of the safety factor
requirements was indicated.
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-39 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-39. These items were reviewed by the NASA Safety Community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings
resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review
(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special
panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve
each specific problem.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factors in this section represent a low-to-moderate increase in
risk above the Level I approved hazard risk baseline. The NASA Safety Community
assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated increase
was acceptable.
Integration 1
Integration 2
New Criticality 1 and 1R2 failure modes have been identified for
the Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket
Boosters.
Upgrade of Engine Interface Unit loss of output Critical Items List
to Criticality 1/1.
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ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-39 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
INTEQRATIQN
1
2
3
New Criticality 1 and 1R2 failure modes have been identified for the
Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket Boosters.
Upgrade of Engine Interface Unit loss of output Critical Items List to
Criticality 1/1.
Backup Flight Software can hang in a "wait" state failure mode.
4-4
4-8
4-9
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak. 4-12
STS-39/OV-103 pilot-side Display Driver Unit Attitude Direction 4-14
Indicator ball hesitation.
STS-37/OV-104 Auxiliary Power Unit #3, Serial Number 307, 4-16
uncommanded Gas Generator Valve Module Shutoff Valve motion.
Lack of weld penetration on STS-39/OV-103 Reaction Control System 4-18
thruster R3A, Serial Number 218.
Potential for lube oil leak on STS-39/OV-103 Auxiliary Power 4-20
Unit #2, Serial Number 301, gearbox.
New Data Processing System failure could lead to a Criticality 1/1 4-21
condition.
Potential for new General Purpose Computers to erroneously 4-23
overwrite memory.
Cracked lugs in STS-39/OV-103 Orbiter/External Tank umbilical 4-26
door mechanism.
Cabin pressure bleed valve anomalies on OV-105. 4-30
Main Propulsion System 3-way helium solenoid valve failed leak tests 4-32
on OV-102.
Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve weld crack found on OV-103. 4-36
New General Purpose Computer, AP-101S, failure mode. 4-38
STS-37/OV-104 short touchdown on Edwards Air Force Base lakebed 4-39
runway.
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-39 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
SRM
3
4
5
6
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump first-stage turbine disc cracking.
High-pressure fuel duct flange radius cracking.
Suspected contamination of engine #2029 High-Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopump.
Pogo standpipe thermal insulator may have been inadvertently
removed during final engine assembly.
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump coolant weld leak.
Engine #2011 found with a leak in the Main Combustion Chamber
Augmented Spark Igniter.
Potential for pad abort caused by purge check valve seat leakage.
Potential for loss of Space Shuttle Main Engine controller redundancy.
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump second-stage turbine blades found
rubbing coolant jet tubes on Unit Number 6009.
Engine #0213 G-15 seal failed during ground testing at Stennis Space
Center.
Test and Evaluation Motor-7 fixed housing ablative liner debond.
Inner Boot Ring bond line separation on STS-38 right-hand Solid
Rocket Motor.
Room-Temperature Vulcanizing was found past the primary O-ring of
nozzle joint #5 on disassembly of Test and Evaluation Motor-7.
Thermal Protection System damage on STS-39 right-hand Solid
Rocket Booster forward assembly.
STS-39 right-hand Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control
hydraulic reservoirs bottomed out in fill direction during Shuttle
Interface Test hydraulic power-up.
STS-37 Right-Hand cowl bond line blowpaths.
4-43
4-45
4-46
4-47
4-48
4-50
4-51
4-53
4-54
4-55
4-57
4-58
4-59
4-61
4-62
4-63
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SECTION 5
STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-37/OV-104 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided. Orbital
Manuvering System (OMS) pod RP03, last used on STS-38/OV-104, has been installed
on STS-39/OV-103. The STS-38 IFA relating to the thruster anomaly on RP03 is
addressed in this section as Orbiter 1.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
5-1 STS-39 Postflight Edition
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ANOMALY PAGE
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Thruster R1U showed low Chamber Pressure on RP03/STS-38.
(IFA No. STS-38-V-07)
Reaction Control System primary thruster R1U failed off during
External Tank separation maneuver.
Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil
while under operation of controller "A".
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Oxygen manifold valve #2
failed to close when commanded.
Indications of low Chamber Pressure on primary thrusters L1U and
L1L during interconnect operations.
Backup Flight Software navigation initialization anomaly.
5-3
5-5
5-7
5-8
5-9
5-10
SRB
1 Left-hand forward skirt skin panel buckling. 5-12
5-2 STS-39 Postflight Edition
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SECTION 6
STS-41 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-41/OV-103 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each anomaly in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
6-1 STS-39 Postflight Edition
SECTION 6 INDEX
STS-41INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO. ANOMALY
INTEGRATION
1
2
3
System Management Nominal Bus Assignment Table General Purpose
Computer #2 assignment anomaly on STS-41.
Aft compartment hydrogen concentration high during ascent.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster aft strut separation device NASA
Standard Initiator detonator separated from the pressure cartridge.
PAGE
6-3
6-4
6-7
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater system "B" 6-10
failed "on" during STS-41.
Inertial Measurement Unit #1 experienced Z-axis accelerometer 6-13
transients.
Backup Flight Software backup cabin delta pressure/delta 6-15
temperature alarm was triggered at Main Engine Cutoff.
STS-41 Commander's Left-Hand Attitude Direction Indicator rate 6-16
scale switch failure.
Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Hydrogen aft attach/separation hole 6-18
plugger failed.
STS-41 Left-Hand Rotation Hand Controller trim inhibit switch 6-19
indicated a contact miscompare.
6-2 STS-39 Postflight Edition
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SECTION 7
STS-39 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-39/OV-103 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-39 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
Abort Region Determinator indicated different abort boundary times
than expected.
PAGE
7-3
ORBITER
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
Flash Evaporator System feedline "A", system #2, heater failure.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Fuel Pump/Gas Generator Valve Module
coolant system "A" valve did not open.
Reaction Control System vernier thruster F5R fuel injector
temperature biased low.
Operations recorder #2 uncommanded configuration before launch
[potential Multiplexer-Demultiplexer hybrid circuit failure].
Supply water dump nozzle temperature drop.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 lube oil outlet pressure was low.
Right-Hand outboard Main Landing Gear tire excessive wear.
Loss of communications during entry.
The Pilot's Rotation Hand Controller bottomed-out during entry.
SSME
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump secondary seal cavity pressure
sensor failure on STS-39, engine #2029.
SRM
Right-Hand Solid Rocket Motor nozzle cowl/Outer Boot Ring
erosion/washing.
7-4
7-5
7-6
7-7
7-8
7-9
7-10
7-11
7-12
7-13
7-15
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AP
ADI
_B
_P-675
AGC
mS
_CA
_FE
amp
AOS
_M
_U
AR
ARD
ASI
An
BFS
C
CA
CAR
CAV
CCP
CEI
CIL
CIRRIS
CIV
CLOUDS
Crit
CRO
CRT
Delta Pressure
Attitude Direction Indicator
Air Force Base
Air Force Program-675
Automatic Gain Control
Arizona Imager/Spectrograph
Aft Load Controller Assembly
Advanced Liquid Feed Experiment
Ampere
Acquisition of Signal
Ascent Particle Monitor
Auxiliary Power Unit
Accepted Risk
Abort Region Determinator
Augmented Spark Igniter
Automatic Test Equipment
Backup Flight Software
Backup Flight System
Controlled
California
Corrective Action Report
Captive Air Vent
Carbon Cloth Phenolic
Contractor End-Item
Critical Items List
Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for Shuttle
Critical Ionization Velocity
Cloud Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems
Criticality
Chemical Release Observation
Cathode Ray Tube
A-1 STS-39 Postflight Edition
CTI
CVF
CWS
DAR
dB
DDU
DEU
DoD
DPS
DR
DSE
EAFB
EDT
EIU
EOD
ET
F
FAR UV
FASCOS
FCS
FCV
FD
FDA
FES
FID
FMEA
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FP
FR
FRI
FRR
ft
ft/sec
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Charlton Technologies, Inc.
Circular Variable Filter
Caution and Warning System
Deviation Approval Request
Decibel
Display Driver Unit
Data Entry Unit
Display Electronic Unit
Department of Defense
Data Processing Software System
Data Processing System
Discrepancy Report
Data System Experiment
Edwards Air Force Base
Eastern Daylight Time
Engine Interface Unit
Erasable Optical Disk
External Tank
Fahrenheit
FAR Ultraviolet Camera
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Flight Control System
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Fault Detection and Annunciator
Flash Evaporator System
Fault Identification
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
Flight Rule
Flow Recirculation Inhibitor
Flight Readiness Review
Feet
Foot Per Second
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
GAS
GG
GGVM
GH 2
GLOS
GN&C
GO2
GOAL
GOX
GPC
GSE
H 2
HAC
HCF
HGDS
HPFTP
HPM
HPOTP
HPU
HR
hr
HSL
HUP
I/O
IBR
IBSS
ICD
IFA
IMU
INTG
IPL
isp
IUS
KSC
kt
Get Away Special
Gas Generator
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Luminosity of Optical Surface
Guidance, Navigation and Control
Gaseous Oxygen
Ground Operations Aerospace Language
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Hydrogen
Heading Alignment Cone
High-Cycle Fatigue
Hazardous Gas Detection System
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High Performance Motor
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Unit
Hazard Report
Hour
Huntsville Simulation Laboratory
Horizon Ultraviolet Program
Input/Output
Inner Boot Ring
Infrared Background Signature Survey
Interface Control Document
Inflight Anomaly
Inertial Measurement Unit
Integration
Initial Program Load
Specific Impulse
Inertial Upper Stage
Kennedy Space Center
Knot
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L-2
lb
lbf
LCC
LCF
LH
LH2
LLCO
LO2
LOS
LOX
LPFTP
LPOTP
LPS
LSFR
MCC
MDM
ME
MEC
MECO
MET
min
MLG
MLP
MMH
MMU
MPEC
MPS
MRB
ms
MSA
MSE
MSFC
N204
NASA
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS. CONTINUED
Launch Minus 2 Day
Pound
Pounds Force
Launch Commit Criteria
Low-Cycle Fatigue
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Low-Level Cutoff
Liquid Oxygen
Loss of Signal
Liquid Oxygen
Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Processing Set
Launch Site Flow Review
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine
Master Event Controller
Main Engine Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Mission Elapsed Time
Minute
Main Landing Gear
Mobile Launch Platform
Monomethyl Hydrazine
Mass Memory Unit
Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister
Main Propulsion System
Material Review Board
millisecond
Marshall Spray-On Ablative
Mission Safety Evaluation
Marshall Space Flight Center
Nitrogen Tetroxide
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
NBAT
NDE
NSI
NSRS
02
OBR
OMRSD
OMS
OPF
OPS
OSMQ
OV
P/N
PAR
PASS
Pc
PF2
PFS
POR
ppm
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psia
psid
psig
PSN
QD
QINMS
RCS
RGA
RH
RHC
RI
Nominal Bus Assignment Table
Nondestructive Evaluation
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
Oxygen
Outer Boot Ring
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Processing Facility
Operational Sequence
Operations
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter Vehicle
Part Number
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Primary Avionics Software System
Chamber Pressure
Payload Forward 2
Primary Flight System
Power-On Reset
Parts Per Million
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Purge Sequence Number
Quick Disconnect
Quadruple Ion-Neutral Mass Spectrometer
Reaction Control System
Rate Gyro Assembly
Right-Hand
Rotation Hand Controller
Rockwell International
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
RM
RME
RMS
ROEU
RSRM
RSS
RTLS
RTV
S/N
SAIL
sccm
SCCS
scfm
scim
SDI
see
SEL
SEM
SII
SIT
SKIRT
SLF
SM
SMS
SOV
SPAS-II
Spec
SRB
SRM
SSC
SSME
SSRP
SSV
STP-01
Redundancy Management
Radiation Monitoring Equipment
Redundancy Management System
Remote Manipulator System
Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Range Safety System
Return-to-Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizing
Serial Number
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Minute
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute
Strategic Defense Initiative
Second
Select
Scanning Electron Microscope
Solid Rocket Motor Ignition Initiator
Shuttle Interface Test
Spacecraft Kinetic Infrared Test
Shuttle Landing Facility
System Management
Systems Management
Shuttle Mission Simulator
Shutoff Valve
Shuttle Pallet Satellite-II
Specification
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Space Shuttle Vehicle
Space Test Program-01
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TAEM
TAL
TDRS
TDRSS
TEM
TFL
TPS
TVC
U/N
UDMH
URA
USBI
UVLIM
UVPI
VAB
WSB
WSTF
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Terminal Area Energy Management
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Test and Evaluation Motor
Telemetry Format Load
Thermal Protection System
Thrust Vector Control
Unit Number
Unsymmetric Dimethyl Hydrazine
Uniformly Redundant Array
United Space Boosters, Inc.
Ultraviolet Limb Imaging Experiment
Ultraviolet Plume Instrument
Vehicle Assembly Building
Water Spray Boiler
White Sands Test Facility
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